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Abstract: Two mechanisms can lead to fiscal strategic interactions between local 
jurisdictions. The first one is due to the tax base mobility. Authorities use fiscal variables to 
attract new resources. The second one is related to information asymmetries between the 
politicians and the constituency. To reduce these asymmetries, voters can compare their 
fiscal situation to the one in neighbouring jurisdictions. These two channels lead to what we 
can refer to as "mobility-led" and "information-led" tax competition. This paper aims at 
discriminating among these two tax competition models in the case of the French regions. 
The econometric tests suggest that when taxes are paid by voters the politicians in office 
seem to be involved in an "information-led" tax competition, while in the case of taxes paid 
by firms, the mobility of the tax base seems to be the best way to explain strategic fiscal 
interactions. 
Keywords: Yardstick competition, Tax competition, Local taxes 
Compétition fiscale régionale: une étude  
empirique sur les régions françaises. 
Page 1 of 23
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cres Email: regional.studies@fm.ru.nl
Regional Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 - 2 -  
Résumé: Deux situations génèrent des interactions stratégiques fiscales entre collectivités 
territoriales. D'une part lorsque les bases imposables sont mobiles, les décideurs publics 
utilisent les variables fiscales pour attirer ces bases sur leur territoire. D'autre part, en cas 
d'information asymétrique en faveur des élus, les électeurs peuvent comparer leur situation 
fiscale à celles des collectivités voisines pour évaluer les performances de leurs 
représentants et les sanctionner aux élections en cas de résultats médiocres. Ce travail vise à 
identifier le vecteur des interactions fiscales entre régions françaises. Ces interactions 
seraient principalement dues à la mobilité des bases pour la taxe professionnelle, et au 
comportement de comparaison pour les taxes d'habitation et foncière bâtie. 
Mots-clés : Compétition par comparaison, Compétition fiscale, Impôts locaux 
 
JEL Classifications: D72, H73, H77 
 
CRES-2007-0162.R1 (French abstract already provided) 
Regionaler Steuerwettbewerb: Belege aus den französischen Regionen 
 
Emmanuelle REULIER and Yvon ROCABOY  
 
 
Abstract:  
Es gibt zwei Mechanismen, die zu Wechselwirkungen zwischen den 
Fiskalstrategien verschiedener lokaler Verwaltungsbezirke führen können. Der erste 
Mechanismus ist in der Mobilität des Steuerwohnsitzes begründet. Durch 
Verwendung fiskaler Variablen bemühen sich die Behörden um die Anwerbung 
neuer Ressourcen. Der zweite Mechanismus steht im Zusammenhang mit den 
Informationsasymmetrien zwischen Politikern und Wählerschaft. Um diese 
Asymmetrien zu verringern, können die Wähler ihre fiskale Situation mit der von 
Wählern in angrenzenden Verwaltungsbezirken vergleichen. Diese beiden Kanäle 
führen zu einem steuerlichen Wettbewerb, der sich als 'mobilitätsgeführt' und 
'informationsgeführt' bezeichnen lässt. In diesem Beitrag wird versucht, anhand des 
Beispiels der französischen Regionen zwischen diesen beiden steuerlichen 
Wettbewerbsmodellen zu unterscheiden. Die ökonometrischen Tests lassen darauf 
schließen, dass die amtierenden Politiker bei Steuern, die von Wählern gezahlt 
werden, sich an einem 'informationsgeführten' steuerlichen Wettbewerb zu 
beteiligen scheinen, während im Fall von Firmensteuern die Mobilität des 
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Steuerwohnsitzes die beste Erklärung für strategische fiskale Wechselwirkungen zu 
sein scheint. 
 
Keywords:  
Yardstick-Wettbewerb 
Steuerlicher Wettbewerb 
Lokalsteuern 
JEL Classifications: D72, H73, H77 
 
CRES-2007-0162.R1 (French abstract already provided) 
Competición impositiva regional:  ejemplo de las regiones francesas 
 
Emmanuelle REULIER  and Yvon ROCABOY  
 
Abstract:  
Existen dos mecanismos que pueden llevan a interacciones estratégicas fiscales 
entre las jurisdicciones locales. El primero  se debe a la movilidad de base 
impositiva. Las autoridades usan las variables fiscales para atraer nuevos recursos. 
El segundo está relacionado con las asimetrías de información entre los políticos y 
los votantes.  Para reducir estas asimetrías, los votantes pueden comparar su 
situación fiscal con las de jurisdicciones vecinas. Estos dos canales conducen a lo 
que denominamos competición fiscal ‘conducida por la movilidad’ y ‘conducida por 
la información’. En este artículo comparamos estos dos modelos de competición 
fiscal en el caso de las regiones francesas. Las pruebas econométricas indican que 
cuando los votantes pagan los impuestos, los políticos en funciones parecen 
participar en una competición impositiva ‘conducida por la información’, mientras 
que en el caso de los impuestos pagados por empresas, la movilidad fiscal parece 
ser la mejor manera de explicar las interacciones fiscales estratégicas. 
Keywords:  
Competición Yardstick 
Competición impositiva 
Impuestos locales 
 
JEL Classifications: D72, H73, H77 
 
 
1. Introduction 
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Since the late nineties many studies have dealt with the strategic interactions between tax 
policy among countries or local governments. There are two main channels through which 
interactions take place. The first one is based on the mobility of tax bases. Under this 
assumption, stressed among others by Wildasin (1988), an action chosen by a jurisdiction 
affects the budget constraint of another jurisdiction, by means of a policy-driven resource 
flow among localities, leading to strategic interactions in local public decisions. The second 
channel due to Salmon (1987) and Besley and Case (1995) consists of information. Some of 
the politicians are supposed to be opportunist and hold private information not available to 
voters. The latter have the possibility to compare their situation to the one prevailing in the 
nearby jurisdictions and to gauge the relative performance of their representatives. 
Anticipating this yardstick behaviour, the politicians take into account not only the program 
of their competitors in their own jurisdiction but also decisions made in the neighbouring 
communities. These two channels lead to what we can refer to as "mobility-led" tax 
competition (commonly known as tax competition) and "information-led" tax competition 
(also known as yardstick competition). 
 
In both cases, we can establish a theoretical correlation between the tax rates of 
neighbouring jurisdictions. Indeed, in order not to suffer a tax base shrinking, or not to be 
considered as bad politicians, decision-makers rationally adopt mimicking behaviours. 
Empirical studies have found the existence of such correlations at the decentralized level of 
government in Europe. It is, for example, the case in Germany (Buettner, 2001), Finland 
(Kangasharju et al, 2006), Spain (Bosh and Solé-Ollé, 2007), Switzerland (Feld and 
Kirchgässner, 2001), France (Feld, Josselin and Rocaboy, 2003), and the Netherlands 
(Allers and Elhorst, 2005).  
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A point remains however widely unexplored. What is the origin of these empirical results? 
Are they due to "mobility-led" or "information-led" inter-jurisdictional competition? Few 
authors have focused on this question. For instance Besley and Case (1995) and Bosh and 
Solé-Ollé (2007) by uncovering that the electoral results in a jurisdiction depend both on 
own tax rates and on neighbouring jurisdictions' tax rates, suggest that yardstick competition 
drives local government fiscal decisions. On the other hand, Buettner (2001) and Brett and 
Pinkse (2000) present results which corroborate the "mobility-led" tax competition theory by 
testing the hypothesis that one tax base of jurisdiction i is affected by the policy enacted in 
jurisdiction i as well as the policy in neighbouring jurisdictions.  
 
In this paper we examine this question but in a rather different way. We use the features of 
the French local tax system to discriminate among the two competing theories. There are 
two kinds of local taxes in France: taxes paid by firms and taxes paid by voters. The 
mobility of firms is potentially higher than that of voters. A priori, if interaction exists for 
both kinds of taxes, mobility would be the best way to explain it for taxes paid by firms, 
whereas information would be responsible for interaction concerning taxes paid by voters. 
Moreover in that latter case, we assume that inferring the right tax level from observing the 
fiscal situations in the neighbouring jurisdictions may be a complicated task for voters, 
particularly when tax rates are very different from one jurisdiction to another. As a result, 
the opportunist politicians may take advantage of the complexity of the comparison to 
increase tax rates in their own jurisdictions. In that case, under the "Yardstick competition" 
hypothesis, there should be a positive correlation between the variance of the nearby tax 
rates and the tax rates of a jurisdiction, ceteris paribus. We investigate this question in the 
case of local taxes at the regional level in France. We find that the taxes paid by voters in 
one French region - a housing tax (Taxe d'habitation) and a property tax (Taxe foncière) - 
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depend positively on the average tax rates of geographically neighbouring regions and on 
the standard-deviation of these tax rates. The larger the standard deviation of neighbouring 
tax rates, the more complicated the comparison is, and the easier it is for politicians to 
increase tax rates. However, this "complicated comparison effect" is not significant when the 
business tax (Taxe professionnelle) is considered. This strengthens the idea that comparison 
would be an important element of the local tax system for voters, whereas tax base mobility 
would be the channel of the interactions among jurisdictions in the case of taxes addressing 
firms. Section 2 briefly summarizes these arguments, section 3 presents the econometric 
tests and the last section concludes the paper.  
 
2. The tax competition theories 
 
The models of local strategic interactions based on capital mobility have the same 
theoretical foundations (Wildasin, 1988). Local public decision-makers are supposed to 
maximise a welfare function positively related to the local public good level. Voters are 
assumed to be immobile and to consume both a private good and a local public good. The 
latter is financed by a tax on capital. Since capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile across 
local jurisdictions, when a given government raises its tax rate, net return on capital located 
there falls and then capital chooses to relocate. Marginal productivit  of capital within the 
jurisdiction of departure increases, while marginal productivity of the jurisdiction of arrival 
decreases. Capital flows carry on until the net return on capital becomes identical 
everywhere. Formally, ρ=− lll tkf )(' , l=1,L and ∑ =
l
l kk  where 'lf  is capital marginal 
productivity in jurisdiction l ( ''0' ll ff >> ), lk  is the stock of capital located in l, lt  is the 
tax rate on capital in l, k  is the total amount of capital in the economy and L the number of 
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jurisdictions. From this system of equations, we can easily compute the change in capital in 
jurisdiction i that results from altering marginally the tax rate in i, ceteris paribus. This 
change is given by:  
01
1
''
<=
∑ =
L
l l
ii f
tk ∂∂        (1) 
A jurisdiction may be induced to lower tax rate in order to attract capital and then to increase 
local public expenditures. For instance, if we assume that the goal of the decision maker in i 
is to maximise the tax revenue coming from the taxation on capital, the tax rate in i results 
from the following maximisation problem:  
{ }
),...,,...,( 1 Liiii
t
tttktRMaximise
i
=       (2) 
The first order condition which is also the Cournot-Nash reaction function of jurisdiction i is 
given by: 
0)),...,,...,((),...,,...,( 11
"
1 =+∑ = iLil
L
l lLii
ttttkftttk     (3) 
Consequently, under the assumption of perfect mobility of capital, a change in tax rate in 
one jurisdiction systematically alters the allocation of capital in the region and results in a 
change in tax rates in the other jurisdictions. This is the "mobility-led" tax competition 
hypothesis.    
 
Salmon (1987) and more recently Besley and Case (1995) have used alternative or 
complementary explanations of public decision-making processes in a setting of fiscal 
federalism. These authors dropped the concept of mobility as explanation for fiscal 
interactions. In their framework fiscal interactions are mainly based on information 
asymmetries between voters and their representatives. In a world of imperfect and 
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asymmetric information, voters have restricted possibilities to evaluate the performance of 
the representatives. Selfish representatives aim at gathering political rents and hence have 
incentives to withhold information about their opportunistic behaviour from voters. 
However, voters can draw inferences on politicians' behaviour, by comparing it to the 
performance of governments and parliaments in neighbouring jurisdictions. Other things 
being equal, these neighbours serve as yardsticks for the voters' evaluation. A bad 
performance in their own jurisdiction compared to other jurisdictions will penalize 
representatives, and their chance of being re-elected drops. Under this theory, public choice 
is not only driven by information gathering from neighbouring jurisdictions, but also by 
fiscal strategic interactions. Because representatives anticipate the yardstick mechanism, 
they are able to stay in power by adapting to the policies of their neighbours.  
 
A constraint on this theory is that the voters' capacity to compare different fiscal situations 
may be limited. When the fiscal or institutional situations in the neighbouring jurisdictions 
are very complex, it may be difficult for the voters to decipher the right tax level from 
comparison. For example, Alt et alii (1998) show in the case of the US States, that when the 
executive and the legislative power are controlled by different parties, increasing tax rate 
does not result in electoral sanction. This may be because the voters find it difficult to 
identify the politicians responsible for this tax increase.  
 
More generally, complexity of local tax systems may be an obstacle for yardstick 
competition to contain opportunistic behaviour. The following simple model is an 
illustration of this hypothesis (see Reulier and Rocaboy (2007) for a more detailed 
presentation of the yardstick competition hypothesis). Suppose the (re)-election probability 
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function of politicians in jurisdiction i is written as: ),,( viviiii ttpp σ= , and ,0<∂∂ ii tp  
,0>vii tp ∂∂  where 
v
it  is the average tax rate of i’s neighbours and 
v
iσ  is the standard 
deviation in i’s neighbours' tax rates which measures the complexity of the comparison. An 
opportunistic politician is assumed to maximize the expected gain G extracted from the time 
spent in office:  
{ }
∆+−= ),,()( viviiiii
t
ttpttGMaximise
i
σ      (4) 
where t  is the tax rate which balances the quantity of local public goods provided in the 
jurisdiction and ∆  is the political rent extracted by the representative from the last time in 
office if re-elected. The first order condition of this maximising program which is also the 
politician i Cournot-Nash reaction function is: 
0),,(1 =
∂
∂
∆+
i
v
i
v
iii
t
ttp σ
       (5) 
and the second order condition: 
0),,( 2
2
<
∂
∂
i
v
i
v
iii
t
ttp σ
        (6) 
From the first order condition 5 and using the implicit function theorem we can deduce the 
effect of an increase in viσ on it  : 
v
iii
ii
v
i
i
tp
tp
d
dt
σσ ∂∂∂
∂∂
−= 2
22
       (7) 
Therefore, if the marginal probability of being (re)-elected )( ii tp ∂∂ depends positively on 
v
iσ  (i.e. 02 >∂∂∂ viii tp σ )  or in other words if the marginal probability of being defeated 
depends negatively on viσ , an increase in 
v
iσ  results in an augmentation of the tax rate in i.  
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Both theories conclude to the existence of fiscal strategic interactions at the local level of 
government, as suggested by equations 3 and 5. The decisive difference between these two 
models lies in the fact that firms respond immediately to a modification in the local tax rates 
by moving (see equation 1). The reason is that companies pay local taxes for obtaining the 
right to locate somewhere. If the tax rate increases relatively more in one jurisdiction, firms 
decide to flee that jurisdiction and relocate in one of the neighbouring jurisdictions where 
the "location price" has remained unchanged.  
 
The situation is different in the case of voters. For the voters, increasing the tax rate means 
benefiting from a larger quantity of local public goods or from local public goods of better 
quality. The problem is that relevant information may not be available to voters. The 
opportunist politicians can then take advantage of this situation to collect more tax revenue 
than the amount required to finance the voters' optimal level of local public goods. And 
justifying an increase in tax rate is easier if the information held by voters is not very clear. 
This is the "complicated comparison effect". This effect does not exist in the case of the 
"mobility-led" tax competition hypothesis. In what follows we test for the existence of such 
an effect in the case of the French local public sector. 
 
3. The econometric analysis 
 
We begin with a short description of the French local public sector. By decreasing size, the 
three levels of local government in France are the "régions", then the "départements", the 
lower level being that of the "communes" (municipalities) and their co-operation structures. 
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The regional level is the object of this study. The French regions are mainly responsible for 
higher education and economic development. Around 50% of the local public expenditures 
at the regional level are financed through taxation; the other 50% comes from grants 
received from the central government. There are four main local taxes in France: a tax on 
housing independent of the property status (taxe d'habitation), two property taxes on 
properties with and without buildings (respectively taxe foncière sur les propriétés bâties, 
and taxe foncière sur les propriétés non-bâties), and a local business tax (taxe 
professionelle).  
 
Business tax accounts for 50% of total tax revenue, while the housing tax and the property 
tax with buildings represent respectively 23% and 25% of total revenue. The remaining 2% 
comes from the property tax without buildings. The rental value of housing is the tax base of 
the housing tax and the property taxes, while the business tax is mainly based on the capital 
of firms located in the jurisdiction. The housing tax and the property taxes are paid by 
voters, while the business tax is paid by firms.  
 
This specificity enables us to test for the existence of a "complicated comparison effect" in 
the case of taxes paid by voters, namely the housing tax and the property tax, while in the 
case of the business tax such an effect should not exist. The fact that getting information 
from comparison may be a complicated task for voters is illustrated in Figure 1. This figure 
displays the housing tax rate for the 22 French regions for year 1989. It is probably more 
complicated to draw inferences on politician behaviour by comparing it with neighbours' 
politician behaviour for voters living in region Limousin than it is for voters living in region 
Bretagne. The tax rate in the regions bordering with region Bretagne i.e. Basse Normandie 
and Pays de Loire are pretty close, respectively 1.55 and 1.34. The situation is radically 
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different in region Limousin. Tax rate in neighbouring jurisdictions ranges from 0.9 to 1.69. 
It is certainly more politically risky for politicians in region Bretagne to unilaterally increase 
tax rate than it is for those in region Limousin.    
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
The empirical tests are performed over the period 1986-1999 for the 22 French regions. The 
econometric model arises from the standard tax-setting equation where strategic interactions 
are considered. The only difference is in the explained variable set in which we add the 
standard deviation in neighbours' tax rates. This variable is used to measure the difficulty of 
comparison. The higher the standard deviation, the more complicated the comparison is1. 
The tax-setting model can be written in matrix form:  
VXtcUt vv ++++= βγσα       (8) 
where:  
- t  is the vector of the regions' tax rates. 
- 
vt  is the vector of the average of regions' geographic neighbours' tax rates lagged by 
one period 2. In this paper we suppose that region i and region j interact if region i is 
bordering with region j. Moreover, we assume that the bordering regions have an 
identical influence whatever the region. Under these assumptions, the variable vt  for 
each region i corresponds to the average of the tax rates of the bordering regions: 
))(( iBb b
v
i BCardtt
ii i
∑ ∈= where iB  is the set of regions ib  bordering with i and ibt  is 
the tax rate in region ib  
3
.  
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- 
v
iσ  is the vector of the standard deviations in geographic neighbours' tax rates lagged by 
one period. The variable viσ  is computed as follows: )()( 2 iBb
v
ib
v
i BCardtt
ii i
∑ ∈ −=σ  
for region i 4.  
 
- U  is the unity vector. 
 
- X is the matrix of k observable regions' economic and demographic characteristics 
lagged by one period: Population, Population density, Average household income, 
Unemployment rate, and grants per capita. 
 
- V is the vector of the error terms which are assumed to be normally distributed with zero 
mean and constant variance. 
 
Finally, we have to take into account three features of this model. First, French local 
governments are not completely free in the matter of tax rate setting. A few limiting rules 
exist which imply some links between the rates of the four taxes. In order not to bias our 
estimates because of the existence of such links, we use a simultaneous-equations model 
with four equations similar to equation 8 corresponding to the four French local taxes. 
Second, there is an endogeneity problem. Hausman tests reveal that the neighbouring tax 
rates are endogenous, so that we cannot estimate this system by OLS. The structure in the 
panel-data allows us to use the instrumental variable method and choose as instruments the 
average demographic and economic characteristics of the neighbouring regions as proposed 
by Kelejian and Robinson (1993) and Kelejian and Prucha (1998). Third, we use the 
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Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator 5 to correct for autocorrelation of errors 
and heteroscedasticity implied by the panel-data structure of the model. Besides, to control 
for all time-specific spatial-invariant variables whose omission could bias the estimates in a 
typical time-series study, we have introduced time period fixed effects. The estimation 
results are given in table 1. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The adjusted coefficient 2R  ranges from 49 to 69% and is greater than 60% for the three 
main regional taxes: the housing tax, the tax on properties with buildings and the business 
tax. The coefficient α  of strategic interactions is individually and globally significant at the 
1% significance level for the four taxes. The higher the average of the tax rates of the 
neighbouring regions, the higher the tax rate in the region under consideration. The size of 
the coefficients reflects that tax mimicking occurs to a large extent for the four regional tax 
rates. For instance, for the business tax, a 1 point increase in the neighbouring regions 
average tax rate leads to a significant rise of 0.798 point in the tax rate of the region under 
consideration. As regards the housing tax, a Wald test indicates that the interaction 
coefficient is not significantly different from the unity.   
 
Regarding the impact of the other variables, population generally has a significant negative 
effect on tax rates. This means that the price elasticity of demand for local public goods is 
low. An increase in the regional population yields a decrease in the tax price for taxpayers, 
thus slightly increasing the local public good provision and then reducing the tax rates. The 
income per head variable has a significant negative impact on tax rates for three of the four 
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regional taxes. In the same vein, the variable grants per capita is statistically significant at 
the 1% level for the property tax with buildings and the business tax and have a  negative 
sign in the four tax setting equations. The unemployment rate and population density do not 
have any significant impact in any of the four equations. Besides, as suggested in table 1 the 
hypothesis that there are no time fixed effects is rejected at 1% level.  
  
Finally as suggested by the theory the coefficient γ  of the standard deviation of the 
neighbouring regions tax rates is individually statistically significant only for the housing 
tax and the property tax with buildings and they both have the expected effect. Indeed, for 
these two taxes paid by voters, the higher the standard deviation, the higher the tax rates, 
ceteris paribus. This may be because opportunist politicians can take advantage of the 
complexity of the comparison to increase the tax rates.  
 
However, the Jarque-Bera statistical tests show that the error terms are not normally 
distributed. A study of the error terms enables us to identify the regions with a different 
behaviour. These regions are Corsica, Picardy, Limousin, Centre and Basse-Normandy 
which are mainly rural regions. After having addressed this problem, the results of the new 
estimations are displayed in table 2. The goodness of fit is widely improved. It is 64 to 78% 
of the variation which is now explained by the model. The coefficient of fiscal interactions 
remains statistically significant for the four regional taxes, although smaller than in the 
previous estimations. As for the housing tax, a 1 point increase in the average of the 
neighbouring tax rates results in a 0.954 points increase in the rate of the region under 
consideration. The "complicated comparison effect" is still statistically significant for the 
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housing tax and the property tax but not for the business tax. The results remain globally 
unchanged for the other variables. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The empirical findings suggest that the French regions adopt strategic behaviour when 
setting tax rates. It seems, however, that the motivations of this behaviour differ depending 
on whether the tax is paid by voters or by firms. On the one hand, when taxes are paid by 
voters (tax on properties with buildings and housing tax) the politicians in office seem to be 
involved in an "information-led" tax competition. They adopt tax mimicking behaviour so as 
to maximize their chances of being re-elected. But the more complicated the comparison is 
for voters, the easier it is for opportunist politicians to increase tax rates. On the other hand, 
for the business tax, the mobility of the tax base seems to be the best way to explain fiscal 
interactions. The "complicated comparison effect" is not significant in that case.  
In addition, yardstick competition is often considered as a way to contain opportunistic 
politician behaviour. The existence of the "complicated comparison effect" calls into 
question this property. When the information available to the voters is fuzzy, it is easier for 
the politicians to justify a tax rate increase, making more difficult the identification of bad 
political decisions. 
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NOTES 
 
1. We tried the coefficient of variation instead of standard deviation. It gave significant 
results but standard deviation performed better. 
2. We have used a row-standardized contiguity matrix, i.e., the spatial weight matrix is 
normalized so the rows sum to unity. This standardization produces a spatially 
dependent lagged variable that represents a vector of average values from 
neighbouring dependent observations. 
3. In the case of i=Bretagne: iB ={Basse-Normandie, Pays de Loire}, and then 
v
it =(1.55+1.34)/2=1.445 (see figure 1). We tried several other weighting matrices 
based on alternative criteria, such as similarity among jurisdictions in population 
structure, similarity in per capita income, and the inverse of the distance between the 
capitals of regions. None of them, though, led to significant improvements upon the 
basic unweighted border sharing specification. 
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4. In the case of i=Bretagne, viσ =0.105. 
5. Estimations are performed with Eviews 4.1, Generalized Method of Moments under 
the options: "Time series (HAC), one step weighting matrix, iterate coefficient, Pre-
whitening, Kernel Options Bartlett, Bandwidth selection fixed (5)". 
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Figure 1: The average Housing tax (Taxe d'habitation) for the 22 French regions in 1989. 
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Table 1: Model of fiscal strategic interactions among the 22 French Regions, GMM, 1986 to 
1999 
 
 Dependent variable  
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Tax  rate 
 of the housing 
tax 
Tax rate of the 
Property tax   
(with buildings) 
Tax rate of the 
local business tax 
Tax rate of the 
Property tax  
(without buildings) 
2χ  
Constant 2.161*  (2.37) 5.63* 
 
Tax rate of neighbouring 
regions: vt  
 
1.171** 
(5.50) 
0.791** 
 (3.12) 
0.798** 
 (3.62) 
0.885** 
 (3.39) 53.41** 
Standard deviation of the 
tax rate of  neighbouring 
regions: vσ  
0.899**  
(3.45) 
0.971** 
 (3.26) 
0.204  
(0.82) 
-0.185  
(-0.54) 18.69** 
           
Population  
 
-0.007* 
 (-2.56) 
-0.019** 
 (-3.12) 
-0.005 
 (-1.13) 
-0.074** 
 (-4.05) 27.01** 
 
Population Density 
 
0.001  
(1.10) 
0.001  
(0.81) 
0.000  
(0.41) 
0.003 
 (1.32) 3.37 
 
Income per capita 
 
-0.003*  
(-2.34) 
-0.003*  
(-1.99) 
-0.002* 
 (-2.04) 
-0.000 
 (-0.08) 7.28 
 
Unemployment rate 
 
-0.023 
(-1.33) 
0.019 
 (0.50) 
0.001 
 (0.05) 
0.060 
 (0.71) 5.74 
 
Grants per capita 
 
-0.002 
 (-0.54) 
-0.42**  
(-7.00) 
-0.048** 
 (-7.30) 
-0.021 
 (-1.51) 87.79** 
 
Time period fixed effects: 
χ2 
 
82.07** 60.03** 77.40** 30.35**  
2R  0.69 0.62 0.61 0.49  
S.E.R. 0.30 0.58 0.40 1.58  
Jarque-Bera 33.86** 8.60* 622.84** 12.10**  
 
Notes : Estimations performed with Eviews 4.1, Generalized Moment Method under the options : "Time  series 
(HAC), one step  weighting matrix, iterate coefficient, Pre-whitening, Kernel Options Bartlett, Bandwidth 
selection fixed (5)". The numbers in parentheses are the values of the estimated t-statistics. ‘**’ ,’*’, ‘(*)’ show 
that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, or 10 percent level respectively. 
SER is the standard error of the regression. and Jarque-Bera the statistic of the Jarque-Bera statistical test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tableau 2 Model of fiscal strategic interactions among the 22 French Regions, GMM, Robust 
estimations, 1986 to 1999 
 
 Dependent variable  
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Tax  rate 
 of the 
housing tax 
Tax rate of the 
Property tax   
(with buildings) 
Tax rate of the 
local business tax 
Tax rate of the 
Property tax  
(without buildings) 
2χ  
Constant 2.666**  (2.85) 8.16** 
 
Tax rate of neighbouring 
regions: vt   
 
0.954**  
(5.01) 
0.638**  
(2.93) 
0.775**  
(3.95) 
0.758**  
(2.83) 37.30** 
Standard deviation of the 
tax rate of  neighbouring 
regions: vσ  
0.650**  
(3.04) 
0.916** 
 (3.26) 
0.125 
 (0.66) 
-0.010  
(-0.03) 14.23** 
 
Population 
 
-0.007**  
(-2.86) 
-0.001*  
(-2.33) 
-0.004  
(-1.16) 
-0.006** 
 (-3.01) 17.23** 
 
Population Density 
 
0.001(*)  
(1.68) 
0.001 
 (0.88) 
0.000  
(0.94) 
0.003  
(1.08) 4.50 
 
Income per capita 
 
-0.003**  
(-2.80) 
-0.004**  
(-2.73) 
-0.003** 
 (-2.80) 
-0.002  
(-1.10) 8.00(*) 
 
Unemployment rate 
 
-0.023  
(-1.34) 
0.27  
(0.82) 
-0.001  
(-0.04) 
0.111  
(1.48) 16.72** 
 
Grants per capita 
 
-0.004 
 (-0.91) 
-0.060**  
(-6.88) 
0.020**  
3.89) 
-0.033  
(-1.42) 55.11** 
 
Time period fixed effects: 
χ2 
 
100.43** 70.82** 103.19** 41.33**  
2R  0.76 0.73 0.78 0.64  
S.E.R. 0.26 0.49 0.30 1.33  
Jarque-Bera 3.69 2.31 2.73 0.59  
Notes : see table 1, dummy variables for the following regions: Corsica, Picardy, Limousin, Centre and 
Basse-Normandy. 
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